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n 2014, deaths among non-Hispanic whites exceeded
births in more states than at any time in U.S. history.
Seventeen states, home to 121 million residents or
roughly 38 percent of the U.S. population, had more deaths
than births among non-Hispanic whites (hereafter referred
to as whites) in 2014, compared to just four in 2004. When
births fail to keep pace with deaths, a region is said to have
a “natural decrease” in population, which can only be offset
by migration gains. In twelve of the seventeen states with
white natural decreases, the white population diminished
overall between 2013 and 2014.
This research is the first to examine the growing incidence of white natural decrease among U.S. states and
to consider its policy implications. Our analysis of the
demographic factors that cause white natural decrease
suggests that the pace is likely to pick up in the future.
Over the last several decades, demographers have
noted the growing incidence of natural decrease in the
United States.1 More widespread natural decrease results
from declining fertility due to the Great Recession, and
the aging of the large baby boom cohorts born between
1946 and 1964. This senior population is projected to
expand from nearly 15 percent of the total population in
2015 to nearly 24 percent in 2060.2 Much of this aging
baby boom population is white, and so white mortality is growing. Together, growing white mortality and
the diminishing number of white births increase the
likelihood of more white natural decrease. In contrast,
births exceed deaths by a considerable margin among
the younger Latino population, and the combination of
these very different demographic trends is increasing the
diversity of the U.S. population.3
Though demographers have documented the growing incidence of natural decrease among the overall
population in U.S. counties, little attention has been
given to its occurrence among racial sub-groups at any
level of geography. To address this gap, we use data

from the National Center for Health Statistics of the
Centers for Disease Control to examine the annual
volume of births and deaths among whites from 1999
to 2014 for each state.4 We focus on whites because
they represent the largest share of the U.S. population
and because their demographic profile increases the
likelihood of natural decrease. We find a significant
rise in the number of states experiencing white natural
decrease in the last few years. The comparison of these
states to others where white births exceed deaths helps
us to understand what combination of demographic
changes produce natural decrease. Though white natural decrease is clearly on the rise, only two states have
more deaths than births in their total populations. This
low incidence of overall natural decrease in U.S. states
reflects the growing importance of Latino natural
increase to overall U.S. demographic trends.
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Fewer White Births and
More White Deaths
Between 1999 and 2014, the number of white births fell by 8.4 percent to 2,150,000 and the number
of white deaths rose by 5.8 percent
to 2,066,000. Both these demographic changes contributed to
waning levels of natural increase
(Figure 1). The pace of decline in
white births intensified from 2007
to 2013, due in part to the Great
Recession’s significant impact on
U.S. fertility.5 The recession, the
greatest shock to the American
economic system in nearly two
generations, influenced both
fertility and life-cycle decisions for
many families.
With significantly fewer white
births and a rising number of
deaths, natural increase (births
minus deaths) plummeted from
393,000 in 1999 to just 82,000
in 2014, a decline of 79 percent. Though the rising volume
of deaths (an increase of nearly
114,000) contributed significantly
to this dwindling natural increase,
it was the diminishing number of
births (a decline of 197,000) that
accounted for most of the reduction in natural increase.
Demographers often use the
birth-to-death ratio (BDR) to
track the changing relationship
between fertility and mortality in
a population. For whites, the BDR
fell from 1.20 in 1999 to just 1.04
in 2014 (Figure 2). Thus, the number of white births for each white
death declined from 1.20 to 1.04.

FIGURE 1. BIRTHS AND DEATHS AMONG WHITES, 1999–2014

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control

FIGURE 2. BIRTH-TO-DEATH RATIO AMONG WHITES, 1999–2014

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control

Increasing Incidence of
States With More White
Deaths Than Births
While national data reflect a significant reduction in natural increase
among whites between 1999 and
2014, the onset of natural decrease
has only occurred recently in many
states. In 1999, four states had white
natural decrease; by 2014 seventeen

states did. The steepest rise
occurred after 2006, when the Great
Recession began to exert a substantial impact on fertility (Figure 3).
Several states have experienced protracted white natural
decrease. It has been occurring
for more than a decade in Florida,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West
Virginia, California, and New
Mexico. Past research on natural
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FIGURE 3. STATES WITH MORE DEATHS THAN BIRTHS AMONG WHITE
POPULATION, 1999–2014

Source: Authors’ compilation of data from National Center for Health Statistic, Centers for Disease Control

decrease in U.S. counties noted that
it was occurring mostly in rural
areas.6 In contrast, state-level white
natural decrease is occurring in
populous states such as California,
Florida, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Arizona, and Massachusetts,
which have diverse economies and
numerous metropolitan areas.
A finding from previous research
on natural decrease, which is
consistent with our findings, is that
once an area begins to experience
natural decrease, the trend is likely
to continue.7 Only California, New
Mexico, and West Virginia have
experienced natural increase after
the initial onset of decrease (Figure
3), and in each case it was only for
a year. This pattern suggests a high
likelihood of future natural decrease
among these seventeen states. More
states are likely to begin to have
white natural decrease in the near
future. Vermont and South Carolina
have each sustained a significant
drop in white natural increase over

the past five years—from 598 in
2010 to just 182 in 2014 in Vermont,
and from 3,120 in 2010 to 339 in
2014 in South Carolina. Tennessee
and Oregon have also recently
experienced precipitous declines in
white natural increase.

Geographic Distribution
of States by Level of
Natural Change
There is considerable spatial variation in the level of white natural
increase or decrease among the
states. Figure 4 divides the fifty states
and the District of Columbia into
three categories based on their white
birth-to-death ratios in 2014: the seventeen natural-decrease states (BDR
less than 1, reflecting fewer births
than deaths); the fifteen states where
births modestly exceeded deaths
(BDR between 1.00 and 1.14); and
the nineteen high natural-increase
states (BDR of 1.15 or higher).

3

White natural decrease states
are widely dispersed, with clusters
in the South, West, and Northeast
regions. States with minimal white
natural increase are also widely
distributed, though they are often
in close proximity to the naturaldecrease states. States with high
natural increase are concentrated
in the Mountain West and the West
North Central regions but also
include Texas, Louisiana, Indiana,
and Virginia.

More Older Adults,
Fewer Mothers, and Low
Fertility Drive White
Natural Decrease
Powerful demographic forces have
combined to raise the incidence
of white natural decrease. Here we
consider four demographic factors that have been identified as
important in accounting for natural
decrease in both the United States
and Europe.8
First, the percentage of the white
population that is 65 and older in
2014 reflects the age structure of the
state.9 Generally, an older population increases the likelihood of
natural decrease due to an increase
in deaths. Second, the percentage of
white women 15 and older who are
in their childbearing years (15–44)
in 2014 signifies the relative share
of women who are capable of giving birth.10 A larger proportion of
women in their childbearing years
is likely to increase the number of
births. Third, the white total fertility
rate in 2014 represents the average
number of births per woman in the
state.11 High fertility rates diminish
the likelihood of natural decrease
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FIGURE 4. STATES BY INCIDENCE OF WHITE NATURAL INCREASE OR
DECREASE, 2014

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control

by increasing the number of births.
Fourth, the percentage of white
females less than 15 years of age
represents the relative availability of
cohorts who will enter their childbearing years in the near future.12
This reflects the potential of the next
generation of women to produce
future children. For each of these
demographic variables, we divided
states into those that rank in the
low, moderate, and high category
based on the state’s value compared
to other states.
The narrowing gap between
white births and deaths reflects the
influence of the first three of these
demographic forces. As expected,
the likelihood of white natural
decrease is greatest in states with a
large concentration of older whites
(Figure 5A). The white population
is aging rapidly, as reflected in a rise

in median age for whites from 39 in
2000 to 43 in 2014. During the same
period, the percentage of persons 65
and older increased from 15 percent
of the white population in 2000 to
18 percent in 2014. Because older
populations face higher mortality
risks, population aging increases
the number of white deaths. Nearly
71 percent of the natural-decrease
states had a high percentage of their
populations in the 65-and-over
category, compared to none of the
states with a relatively high white
birth-to-death ratio.
Another important factor is
the proportional share of white
women of childbearing age.
Previous research suggests that
natural decrease is more likely
when there are fewer women
of childbearing age. Overall,
the number of white women of

childbearing age (15–44) declined
by 4.7 million between 2000
and 2014, or nearly 12 percent.
Approximately 71 percent of
the natural-decrease states had
relatively few white women of
childbearing age (Figure 5B). In
contrast, nearly 74 percent of the
high natural-increase states had
a high percentage of women of
childbearing age.
White natural decrease is also
more common in states that have
low white fertility rates. Nearly 65
percent of the natural-decrease
states are in the lowest fertility category, compared to just 16
percent of the states with high
levels of natural increase (Figure
5C). However, the differences here
are less pronounced than those
for the proportion over 65 and for
the proportion of women in their
childbearing years. Some naturaldecrease states have moderate or
relatively high fertility levels.
The demographic factors examined so far help to explain why
some states currently have white
natural decrease and others do not.
The percent of the female population less than 15 years old gives
us a glimpse of the future. States
with smaller proportions of white
females under 15 have less potential for future white births than
states with larger portions of young
females. Most natural-decrease
states have relatively small cohorts
of young white females, thus the
risk of continued natural decrease
is high for them (Figure 5D). In
contrast, states that currently have
a large excess of white births over
deaths also have a larger percentage of young white females able to
produce the next generation.
In sum, the likelihood of white
natural decrease is greatest in states
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FIGURE 5. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF STATES BY LEVEL OF NATURAL CHANGE ASSOCIATED WITH
FOUR EXPLANATORY FACTORS AMONG WHITES, 2014

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control; U.S. Census Bureau population estimates; and American Community Survey public-use file.

that have a larger proportion of
older adults, a smaller proportion of
women of childbearing age, and a
lower fertility rate.

Few States Have Natural
Decline in Total Population
Though one-third of U.S. states
had more white deaths than white
births in 2014, only two states—
West Virginia and Maine—had
more deaths than births in their

overall populations. West Virginia
has had natural decrease in its total
population in twelve of the last sixteen years; Maine has experienced
it in each of the last four years
(2011–2014). The other fifteen
states with white natural decrease
are still experiencing overall natural increase because other racial/
ethnic populations, especially
Latinos, produced a great enough
surplus of births over deaths to
offset the white natural decrease.

The Latino population is considerably younger (median age of 28.4 in
2014) and has higher fertility rates
than the white population, and so
Latino births exceeded deaths by a
substantial margin in all fifty states
and the District of Columbia in 2014.
In twelve of the seventeen states
with more white deaths than births
in 2014, Latino natural increase
alone was sufficient to offset the natural decline of whites. In California,
for example, the Latino natural
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increase of 193,311 was far greater
than the 13,168 natural decrease of
whites. However, in the other five
states, the natural decline of whites
was greater than the Latino natural
increase. In Florida, for example, the
Latino natural increase was 39,768,
compared to a natural decrease of
40,565 among whites. Gains among
other minorities in Florida supplemented the Latino gain to produce
an overall natural increase. In Maine
and West Virginia, the two states
with overall natural decline, there
were few Latinos or members of
other minority groups to offset the
white natural decrease.

Conclusion
Our research, the first to examine
white natural decrease at the state
level, finds that seventeen states are
experiencing it currently and that its
occurrence has increased substantially over the past decade. We also
find that several of the states experiencing white natural decline are
among the nation’s most populous
and urbanized. Here our findings differ from prior county-level research
that has suggested that overall natural
decrease tends to be concentrated in
rural areas of the Great Plains.13
A policy issue with significant
implications for white natural
decrease is the increasing rate of
mortality among working-class
whites from drug and alcohol abuse
and suicide.14 Drug-induced deaths
(including intentional suicide
deaths and accidental drug overdose
deaths) outnumbered motor vehicle
accident deaths among whites in
forty-one states in 2014 compared
to ten states in 2004.15 All but two
of the seventeen states where white
deaths exceeded births had more
drug-induced deaths than motor

vehicle accident deaths in 2014.
Such drug-related overdose deaths
are likely to speed the transition
from natural increase to natural
decrease in some states.
The growing natural decline
among whites in U.S. states contributes to the larger racial/ethnic shifts
occurring in the U.S. population. As
white natural increase has diminished, the share of the U.S. population that is white has declined from
79.6 percent in 1980 to 61.9 percent
in 2014. Census Bureau projections
suggest that the white population
will begin to decline in absolute
numbers between 2030 and 2040,
and that by 2050 whites will constitute less than half (47 percent) of
the U.S. population.16
In contrast, the youthful Latino
population has increased significantly over the last three decades.
It is responsible for the majority of
all U.S. population increase and is
expected to contribute even more in
the future.17 The share of the nation’s
population that is Latino rose from
6.4 percent in 1980 to 17.3 percent
in 2014, and it is projected to reach
29 percent by 2060.18
As we have seen, Latino natural increase has been a significant contributor to overall U.S.
natural increase over the past
several decades. However, it diminished with the onset of the Great
Recession, declining from 927,000
in 2007 to 745,000 in 2014. Factors
contributing to this decline include a
significant drop in immigration from
Mexico19 and a substantial reduction in births.20 Latina births fell by
14 percent between 2007 and 2014,
twice as great as the decline in white
births (7 percent).21 Further reductions in fertility as well as reduced
immigration for Latinos could make
it less likely that Latino natural

increase will be sufficient to offset
white natural decline in some states.
The demographic trends underlying the current natural decline of
whites and the increasing shift to a
more racially/ethnically diverse U.S.
population have major policy implications. First, the largely white older
population will grow rapidly as
baby boom cohorts continue to age.
As they do, demands on the health
care and retirement system will
dramatically increase. Second, the
youthful population—increasingly
a population of color—will require
major investments in education and
training if the United States is to
maintain a productive workforce in
an increasingly competitive technological and global labor market.
With an aging white population
and a youthful population increasingly of color, each with competing
demands on government budgets,
there is considerable potential
for conflicts concerning funding priorities. However, these new
generations of color also provide a
potential demographic lifeline to
America’s aging white population
by reinvigorating local commerce
and labor markets and by fostering
economic development that will
contribute to meeting the growing
demands on the nation’s health care
and retirement programs.22
Natural decrease is the ultimate
demographic consequence of
population aging, low fertility, and
a diminishing proportion of the
childbearing-age population. The
rapid rise in the number of U.S.
states experiencing white natural
decrease reflects the demographic
changes underway. Our analysis
suggests that more states are likely
to experience white natural decrease
in the near future. However, there is
a low probability of natural decrease
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in the overall population in most
states in the foreseeable future due
to the substantial natural increase
among Latinos, African Americans,
Asians, and native peoples.
Many developed nations already
face far more widespread natural
decrease than the United States.23 In
Europe, overall deaths exceed births
in seventeen countries.24 Compared
to the United States, European
fertility rates are lower, the population is considerably older, and there
are fewer women of childbearing
age. Thus, the immediate challenges
European nations face in dealing
with widespread natural decrease
may provide important lessons to
U.S. policy makers as they prepare
to address this issue in the future.

agencies. NCHS data do not allow
for classification of multiple-race
births or deaths—so all births are
classified into one race category, that
of the infant’s mother; the race and
Hispanic origin of the infant’s father
are not considered. In contrast,
Census Bureau estimates allow inclusion of births and deaths of two or
more races. NCHS data consistently
show more non-Hispanic white
births and fewer Hispanic births
than Census data at the national
level. Thus, our calculations likely
underestimate white natural decrease
compared to similar estimates using
Census Bureau data. Only NCHS
data are available for race/Hispanic
origin of births and deaths for states.

Cause of Death, 1999–2014” (Atlanta,
GA: CDC, 2016a), accessed at http://
wonder.cdc.gov/ucd-icd10.html on July
1, 2016; Centers for Disease Control,
“CDC WONDER Database: Live Births”
(Atlanta, GA: CDC, 2016b), accessed at
http://wonder.cdc.gov/natality.html on
July 1, 2016.
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